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BOOK REVIEWS
WHAT Is JusTcr, by Hans Kelsen. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957.
397 pp.
The critic of Kelsen enjoys the unenviable position of crossing swords with the
lordly; and so one is tempted to concede value to his works rather than to analyze that
work as distinct from the aura of the author. Indeed, one need not fawn to find much
that is worthwhile in Hans Kelsen's recent book, "WHAT Is JUsTICe?" Particu-
larly significant, and generally expressive of Kelsen's jurisprudential view are the
chapters entitled: The Law as a Specific Social Technique; Law State and Justice in
the Pure Theory of Law; and Science and Politics. Provocatively presented are the
tenets of law as a function devoid of quality, law as an entity outside of politics, and
the positive or normative system of law. Law is, reduced to its simplest denominator,
a means whereby a group or community may be coerced into following a specific social
pattern. It is this coercive element (or effectiveness or compulsion as preferred by
the author), acting upon a communal unit, which distinguishes law from acts or ab-
stentions induced by moral or religious pressures on the one hand and the "coercion"
whereby a brigant exacts a toll or specified conduct from the individual. And this
coercive means may be traced to a final source: an avowedly accepted constitution,
custom, or the force of an autocratic government Thus law need only be consistent
with its source, i.e., Basic Norm, to be "law" and only incidentally will be good or
bad; the latter element of quality being of no concern to the legal scientist. When, for
example, a legislative body grants the right of franchise to those who have reached the
age of eighteen years, our enquiry is not directed at the wisdom or desirability of such
an act but only whether the promulgating body had authority to so legislate.
Granting this premise, then, law creates itself from the Basic Norm (e.g., our fed-
eral and state constitutions) and there is no need for its justification. Justification or
motivation are political questions not to be confused with the juristic one. Yet even
more dangerous is the substitution of political aims or ideology for legal reasoning.
The stern scrutiny of Kelsen's theory denudes much of our hysteria-induced and politi-
cally proclaimed "law" of its juridical vesture; e.g., the present day passport situation,
Japanese internment during World War II. Our complex civilization makes it im-
perative, if law is not to become subservient to politics (as indeed it was to religion for
many centuries), that we maintain a clear and thorough concept of jurisprudence. The
positive law system affords a firm foundation from which to do this. It is, perhaps, the
simplicity of this definition which is so universally perplexing. A thing of such conse-
quence in ordering the lives of humanity must have a more oracular formula. And so
it is that often we search, not to determine whether this "law" is in accord with the
charter power of the governmental unit declaring it (constitution, etc.), but for its
effect on one group or another. The result is that an act may be lawful or unlawful
as one may have peace or war, as capital, labor or the farmer may be favored, or as
one group or another may exert sufficient pressure. While this may well serve a social
purpose, is there any more reason why the content or validity of law should change with
one's mood than an apple? An apple does not become a lemon by reason of wishing it
so, nor should law.
There is, however, a marked weakness inherent in presenting a collection of essays as
having a specific aim. First, the material will lack adequate coherency of structure as a
progressive unit. Second, duplication is inevitable. Both faults are apparent in this
book and the more conspicuous not only because of the stature of the author, but
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because it is evident that with little revision this could have been avoided. The result
of the latter fault is boredom; of the former, vacuity. When the volume has been
read, if we grant merit to the individual essays, the question remains, when do we
consider what is justice? By its very indefinability, justice requires a comprehensive
approach, not a narrow one, though it be ever so minute or technically correct. The
perspective must coincide with the nature of the problem. Discussing justice in the
Scriptures, as is done in a lengthy chapter, by considering isolated passages out of
context is neither a rational consideration of the one nor the other.
This gun-barrel vision approach involves Kelsen in another difficulty. His analytical
critique is merciless to others, yet he does not subject himself to the crucible of
enquiry. He ridicules the Social Contract, is anathema to Natural Law, and finds no
place for Justice within any system or theory of law. But that any of the foregoing
be imperfect does not make of it offal. Do we not, in many respects, and emphatically
here in America, have Social Contract as a fact? Is not our constitution the hier-
archical peak or Basic Norm, and do we not modify, and did we not originally accept
it by popular expression, and is this neither more nor less than Social Contract? And,
a fortiori, is this not so with reference to state and municipal government? True
enough, the earlier writers thought of Natural Law in terms of "nature" and nature
is a physical, not a moral, system. But what was not entirely clear to those men is
that mankind lives "apart" from and in defiance of nature. They sought to derive
from nature that which is man's own creation and exists not in nature: justice. Or,
that which is in the nature of man. Natural Law must be equated with justice, not
nature. I cannot conceive that there exists an inherent sense of justice. The notion of
justice is conceived by the individual or community as a product of his environment.
Thus that which is just at a given time and place may be considered unjust at another.
Justice, then, is coincident with the Golden Rule, not, however, with the universal
application but with each communal unit or sphere as a distinct standard. Justice need
not be the same at all times and at all places any more than any other thing which
appertains to social structure or values and this includes positive law. Justice pervades
the law and more is to be gained by its cognition than its denial.
Unfortunately, there remains a further legitimate criticism to be voiced. Kelsen
prides himself on being a "scientist," yet his definition of science is obviously knowl-
edge per se and not its systematic utilization. He clarifies our understanding of law
but remains aloof to reality. It is enough that the legal philosopher deal with abstrac-
tions, but the legal scientist must apply his knowledge to life. As lawyers, legislators
and jurists, we deal with life and we need tangible standards that enable us to effec-
tively concretize or apply the law as a necessary part of our affairs. Kelsen, in a time
when sorely needed, has failed to blaze a trail and we remain, perhaps less confused,
but still lost.
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